Dynamic Cooperative Games of the Promotion of Innovations in the Universities with Consideration of the Opportunistic Behavior

Control of the promotion of innovations in organizations, including universities, is extremely important for increasing their efficiency, competitiveness and quality of work. There are mathematical models of the innovative development of different types. In this paper we have built and investigated in the cooperative setup a three-level dynamic discrete model of the promotion of innovations in the universities based on Cournot oligopoly with consideration of a possible opportunistic behavior of the control agents on lower and middle levels of hierarchy. The cooperative game is described in the form of characteristic functions by von Neumann-Morgenstern, Petrosyan-Zaccour and Gromova-Petrosyan, and their values are calculated numerically by simulation modeling. We have conducted a comparative analysis of the results and make a conclusion that one of the methods of fighting against opportunistic behavior in hierarchical systems may be allowing to the agents a possibility to form coalitions.

Keywords

cooperative games; characteristic function; simulation modelling; universities management; opportunistic behavior.

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